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## **The Second World War in Lviv Cityscape: Creating the Cornerstone for the City's Postwar Identity**

In this presentation I will talk about parts from the chapter on Inscription and Erasure of the Second World War in Lviv cityscape. World War Two was a turning point in the city's history, while the experience of the war was strongly imprinted both in the city's outlook and in the memory of those people who came to inhabit it after the war or were expelled. Tracing the appearance of new sites commemorating the Second World War, changes in the topics, which they brought to public commemoration, and the commemorative language, which they used, I will discuss the overall development of the publicly allowed commemorative framework as it was part of making the Soviet Lviv. At the same time, I am pointing out tensions, which it provoked in relation to Lviv post-war society and the city's experience of war. The official tale of the war was integrated as a pillar for new identity for the city. Therefore, looking at the dynamics of commemoration and making the war mythologies for it, helps to assess how its legacies influenced and shaped the post-Communist re-making of city's image.

As I have a cityscape in the topic of my thesis I am focusing on spatial expressions of the Second World War commemoration, both through what was inscribed and what was erased. First of all these are monuments, but also sites, marked in different ways, and the city as a whole was serving a stage for the commemorative rituals. It is important for my research to see the individual "biographies" of memorials, using the term from James Young's work on the Holocaust memorials.<sup>1</sup> In particular, because the sites commemorating war experiences are called to keep or impose a certain vision of the past and therefore invite the researcher to ask in what manner meaning is assigned to them, what are the differences among them, and how they influence society's understanding of its past.<sup>2</sup> The space was one of the key vessels to carry the official vision of the identity and collective memory for new inhabitants of Lviv. Memory of the war could thus also be seen as an instrument that on the one hand enhanced and strengthened new polities, but on the other hand, excluded others, leaving them "invisible."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Young, *Texture*, p.ix

<sup>2</sup> James M. Mayo, "War Memorials as Political Memory," *Geographical Review*, vol. 78, nr. 1, January 1988, p. 62

<sup>3</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 39

While in my research there is more about strategies of placing official Soviet variant of the war myth (*Great Fatherland War*), the interplay between this official tale and private/different memories are also discussed. In tracing the public display of monuments in Lviv over four decades after 1944/45, I was interested first of all in the evolution of their significance and meaning in the context of changes within the general commemorative framework in Soviet Ukraine (and the Soviet Union) and their place in shaping local identity for the city.

First of all for Lviv the context of the making of the war myth in the Soviet Union is absolutely crucial.<sup>4</sup> Therefore in researching the “biographies” of monuments but also of sites, I was looking for the implication of the larger “myth of the war” for the given locality, which is Lviv. And in turn, what were the experiences and expectations in the city that the myth had to encompass in order to be anchored there and operate on the ground. On the territories that were part of the Soviet Union prior to 1939, the myth was built to cover failures and problems with earlier myths of the civil war, collectivization, and industrialization.<sup>5</sup> For Lviv and western regions of Ukraine, the war tale had to suppress the pre-war otherness, both in social life, but also the memory of other citizens, Jews and Poles, and especially the tradition of Ukrainian nationalism. Generally, the end of the war marked a split between the place and society. People who lived there before and during the war were either killed during the occupation in case of Lviv – in case of Jewish population. Majority of Poles who survived the occupation and siege were expelled between 1944 and 1946.

The myth of war and the experience of the millions of soldiers created a community of people who were entering the post-war life as heroes and active participants of the event. Such tremendous social shift reorganized post-war societies and resulted in emergence of milieus of veterans, people who shared similar experience and families of soldiers who returned or were killed but entered pantheon of “fallen heroes.” At the same time many were written out from official war tale.<sup>6</sup>

From the very moment of the end of the war for given city and the region trough following decades, the myth of war was integrated into the daily life of the post-war societies through set of rituals, be it initiation into pioneers or Komsomol, marriage, receiving passports to participation in organized activities, from demonstrations to group visits of sites of battles. The myth of war was almost omnipresent. Indeed this was an official myth based on the party-state ideology and policies, but with numerous daily practices and institutions, with a possibility for ordinary citizens to integrate themselves into a larger body politic and body city.<sup>7</sup> Common memory had to become a constituent part of these

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<sup>4</sup> For excellent analysis of the role the war myth played for the Soviet society see Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, especially Introduction and the chapter 1

<sup>5</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 18-19

<sup>6</sup> More about this shift on the example of Vinnytsia region see in Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, pp. 52-81

<sup>7</sup> More about individuals fashioning and integrating themselves into Soviet system see in Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 25-27, Kotkin, chapters 5-7, Halfin, Hellbeck

practices. Therefore, the display of the official war tale in these two cities was perceived by the party-state as one of the pillars for building new identities both for the city as a whole and community in particular. At the same time, for local population of western parts of Ukraine it was precisely the war that was associated with collectivization, famine, terror and civil war. This partly explains the deterioration of the myth and its break in 1990-1991.

Apart from inscription there was erasure. Deleting signs of past after the war was part of reworking the memory of the recent years, decades and even centuries. Western regions of the post-war Soviet Union had to erase features of pre-war belonging to other states. In Lviv this meant de-Polonization and partly de-Nazification, as city has been displaying signs of German occupation. De-Polonization in Lviv was continuation of reshaping the city from the 1939-1941 period, but in more complete way. De-Polonization of cityscape went together with expulsion and deportation of Polish population. In all these cases, city occupied a special place as a site, where symbols defined for erasure were concentrated.

Generally, post-war years were time, when many cities throughout Europe changed their appearances in a process of destroying signs indicating unwanted past.<sup>8</sup> Cities, which due to the outcome of the war had unsuitable past, were purged of signs, names, monuments, architectural details, and in most radical way, of people to fit into new contexts. Thus, Lviv was among such cities. It experienced large-scale, but also unrealistic, project of de-Polonization of the city, which embraced inhabitants, deported to Poland, and material fabric, erased, destroyed or moved away from the city. The initiative to erase all signs of “otherness” and “alien features” of the city, coming from eagerness to establish new image for Lviv, has failed to succeed.<sup>9</sup> Vigilance of early years, often in words and less in deeds, indeed changed majority of inscriptions, signs, monuments, and other elements of urban fabric associated with preceding Polish period. Yet, as Poles were expelled and Jews were previously murdered, and it was clearer that the city is turning into Soviet Ukrainian one, first of all demographically, the initial preoccupation was getting less strong.<sup>10</sup> Inability to purge the city completely was supported by reinventing new stories for sites, monuments, and places. Such “gaps” in purging the city turned into reservoirs of the memory of “otherness” in the city. At the same time, we can not overestimate the meaning of such “gaps,” as the knowledge about different versions of the cities’ pasts was kept outside of the official narrative. Moreover, memories of Lwów were also outside of the country.

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<sup>8</sup> For example, for Munich Gavriel Rosenfeld singles out term “urban denazification,” see Rosenfeld, *Munich and Memory*, p. 80.

<sup>9</sup> On the “failure” to erase the signs of Nazi past in Munich and its function to preserve, evoke, as well as confront the Nazi past and its legacies, see Rosenfeld, *Munich and Memory*, p. 83

<sup>10</sup> In following decades the need to purge the city was occasionally activated. For Lviv this would happen in the early 1970s, when Polish Military Cemetery was bulldozed in 1972, partly as a reaction to social unrests in neighboring Poland.

Before going into several examples, I want to name some topics which were erased from Soviet Lviv war tale, as here it was more selective attitude.

The topics for erasure would list:

- Polish Home Army underground (the largest in the city)
- Jewish resistance groups
- Council for Assistance to Jews, consisting mainly of gentile Polish left-wing intelligentsia
- Initiative of Greek-Catholic church to rescue Jews
- other forms of resistance
- Downplayed the Holocaust as a Nazi policy aimed at complete extermination of Jews; in Soviet narrative Jews were usually hidden behind notion “Soviet citizens”
- Downplayed collaboration, focusing mainly on Ukrainian nationalist organizations as chief and solely collaborators among Ukrainians

### **The First Sites Commemorating the War in Lviv**

The first monument commemorating the war was a tank which according to the Lviv war tale entered the city first, sacrificing the life of its commander to install the red flag on the town hall. It was opened in 1945 – as a military artifact put on pedestal. The monument was located at Lychakivska Street, known by the time of opening as Lenin street.

The street, formerly and presently Łyczakowska/Lychakiwska was a site shaped by the practices of imposing ideological dominance. Generally throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century Łyczakowska /Lenina /Lychakivska Street as one of the main entrance arteries of the city, leading from the northern suburbs to the city center was repeatedly used as a place for displaying subsequently either national mobilization of Polish community in inter-war Lwów, or strength of Soviet Lvivian/Lvovian community. In upper Łyczaków there was a cemetery turned into the pantheon of Polish culture and perceived as one of the focus points of the Polish Lwów. In 1990 when president of Polish Republic Wojciech Jaruzelski has been in Lviv his first visit was to the Lychakiv called in Polish news “one of four pantheons of old and present Polish state.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Other three were Rossa (Wilno/Vilnius), Powązki (Warsaw), Cmentarz Rakowiecki (Kraków). On Łyczaków cemetery and its symbolism for Polish national movement and state tradition see Ewa Ziólkowska, „Kwatera postaćców listopadowych na Cmentarzu Łyczakowskim,” *Pamięć i Przyszłość*, nr. 4, 1999, pp. 37-41, p. 37f; Stanisław S. Nicieja, *Cmentarz Łyczakowski we Lwowie w latach 1789-1986*, wyd. 2, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1990, 449p, p. 273f.



**Picture 1 The Ceremony of the Consecration of the Sharp Gate Madonna Church (Kościół Matki Boskiej Ostrobramskiej), Łyczakowska Street, Lwów, November 7, 1934**

The Łyczakowska Street before the war was dominated at the end by the Rome-Catholic church of the Sharp Gate Madonna (Kościół Matki Boskiej Ostrobramskiej) built in 1920 to commemorate. Thus, this church became a symbolic coronation of the path linking the city center with Łyczaków Cemetery, where fallen fighters for Polish Lwów in 1918 and soldiers fallen in the Polish-Bolshevik war were buried. The entire street was therefore transformed into a stage reaffirming and replaying Polish character of the city. In one of the post-1989 memoirs collected in Wrocław we can find a description of how the Łyczakowska Street was turned into a symbolic ground form where messages were sent both to the Polish and non-Polish citizens of Lwów. These recollection deals with the tradition established by the Polish schools in the 1920s and the 1930s to organize marches to the church at the end of the Łyczaków street for manifesting both their presence and claims in the city populated by three main ethnic groups – Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians.

Let us look closer at the ensemble at the end of Łyczakowska Street and some messages it was sending through its outlook to the city laying beneath. From the text of Aleksandr Medyński published in

1938 we can extract number of symbols assigned to the church built between 1920 and 1934 but also perceived by some part of Lwów Polish population.

It is important to have a retrospective view of the meanings assigned to the place in pre-Soviet Lviv as around the same space Soviet authorities were siting new objects, embedded with different meanings and sending a different message. The associations with the pre-Soviet function and symbolism of the church, cemetery, and entire area were of course kept by Lwówians forced to leave the city after 1944 or pre-1939/44 inhabitants, or at least known to many of them. Yet, the selection of sites for new monuments in Soviet Lviv betrays the high probability that the new authorities were aware of previous symbolic meaning of these sites in Polish Lwów. Therefore, before moving to the analysis of post-1944 strategies of siting memory of World War Two (under the name Great Patriotic War), a short overview of inter-war projects of marking cityscape with symbols of city's loyalty to Polish tradition serves as an appropriate introduction.

The Ostrobramska church was located at the eastern exist from the city. Such location was highly emblematic in the context of the image of Lwów as a bulwark of against the East.<sup>12</sup> Thus the church was perceived as a both symbol of victory over Bolshevik Army but in larger meaning also as a site standing for longer tradition of East-West juxtaposition. Not accidentally, the fact that the church was on a very place where "from the eastern side a Bolshevik shell fallen," an artifact of recent and victorious war with Bolshevik state, was incorporated into a set of images and association ascribed to this newly built church.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the monumental building of the church signaled for some contemporaries that "old Polish lands stretching in the further [east]."<sup>14</sup> As we will see later, the adjectives chosen to describe both a silhouette and location of the Ostrobramska Church were strikingly similar to the adjectives used to depict characteristics of a monumental Soviet project, the Hill of Glory at the end of Łyczakowska/Lenin Street in post-war decade. It would be praised for its dominative and monumental outlook overseeing the city down in a valley at the end of the 1940s. The location of church was framed in a very similar manner:

The church is reigning over entire area and its tower as a kind of religious and national bastion of Lviv's spiritual fortifications is visible for kilometers in eastern direction... sharp-ended campanile dominates surroundings... overlooking the city.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See article of Heidi Hein "The Idea of Lviv as a Bulwark against the East," in *Imagining the City. The Politics of Urban Space Series: Cultural History and Literary Imagination*, Volume 2, ed. by Christian Emden, Catherine Keen, and David Midgley, Oxford, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Wien: Peter Lang Verlag, 2006. 385 p, pp. 321-337, especially p. 333f.

<sup>13</sup> Aleksandr Medyński, *Kościół Matki Boskiej Ostrobramskiej na Łyczakowie*. Lwów: Nakładem Ks. Ks. Salezjanów, 1938, available at <http://www.lwow.home.pl/kosciol/ostrobramska/kosciol.html>, accessed May 15, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Medyński, *Kościół Matki Boskiej Ostrobramskiej* accessed May 15, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Medyński, *Kościół Matki Boskiej Ostrobramskiej* accessed May 15, 2008.

Thus, the combination of location, symbolism of details but also of entire building, as well as placement of ritual ceremonies made the church into a site charged with a range of symbolic messages. The post-1944 attempts of the Soviet authorities were aimed both at downplaying this image and at the same time imposing a new one exactly in the same area. While for the Polish national symbolism the references to the First World War, the Polish-Ukrainian war, and Polish-Bolshevik war served as key points, for the Soviet image these were the victory in the Second World War together with the overarching story of the Great Patriotic War.

### **The Change: Łyczakowska as a Site of Soviet Story for the City**

The Łyczkowska Street was renamed after 1944 into the Lenin Street and the first monument to the Second World War was erected in 1945. This was a tank commemorating soldiers fighting on tanks within the army of general Lelyushenko. The monument stayed there until 1991, when the tank was taken away.



**Picture 2 From Newsreels (FILM): Unveiling of the tank monument, Lviv: The First Secretary of Lviv Obkom Ivan Hrushetskyi Speaking**

The tank was located precisely in front of the Ostrobramska Church. Moreover, the church was turned into a magazine for vegetables and food. Thus, the tank was placed between the city center down to now Lenin Street and the church, pointing with its gun pointed to the city keeping it like a target.



In such a way it had to symbolize not only the victory over the German troops but also establishment of a new point of reference both in time and space: as part of new beginning for the city and the spatial rearrangement of symbols, when past is remade and future is guarded. From the very beginning, the monument was wrapped into a story aimed to present Lviv as “loyal to the Ukrainian and Soviet idea.” Thus, the aim of the rearranging the symbolic space at the upper Lenin Street was opposite to the message of the church but structurally very similar.

When the tank-monument was placed looking down on the Lviv center beneath, it also has got a legendary story about city’s inhabitants waiting and greeting the Red Army soldiers entering the city. The story of a local boy saving the tank and its crew by showing the position of the artillery of the Nazi German troops carries a motif of unity between generations, soldiers and civilians, and moreover between Soviet state and its new city. The boy’s name – Petro Lutsiv – a Ukrainian one has been deliberately chosen to show unification of the Ukrainian territories, a story that shaped the representation of the city and its belonging.<sup>16</sup>

### The First Monumental Project Commemorating the War in Lviv: “War as Liberation, Unification, and Historical Justice”

In 1955 local newspaper started article on commemoration of the Second World War in Lviv precisely from the description of the Hill of Glory location – “on the high hill from where picturesque panorama of

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<sup>16</sup> M. Romanchenko “Holm Slavy” [The Hill of Glory], *Vilna Ukraina*, 9 May, 1955, nr. 109, p.4.

Lviv is opening there are graves of soldiers who died in ...battles ... for victory”.<sup>17</sup> Even if not central, but very prominent location of the Hill, allowing to use adjective “dominating,” was signaling significance of this commemorative project for Soviet Lviv. This large-scale project of creating a memorial cemetery was executed during almost entire decade after the war was over and became the largest Soviet monument in the city as it was planned. The memorial was a burial site for more than 330 officers.

The cemetery indeed became the largest Soviet monument in the city as it was originally planned. Moreover, even if not central, but very prominent location of the Hill, allowing to use adjective “dominating,” was already signaling significance of this commemorative project for Soviet Lviv. Similarly to the interwar Ostrobramska Church, the authors of the Hill made a point from its physical location overlooking the city. While, the Church was a symbol of the Polish character of the eastern borderland, *Kresy*, and at the same time, of Lwów as a stronghold against the east, the Hill was a symbol of the opposite. It represented the aim to turn Lviv into a stronghold of Soviet project and making it a Ukrainian borderland city also signals the dominance over the region, including satellite Communist states. No doubt that looking at the discussions and decisions about the Hill of Glory, we are analyzing the key element in creation the Soviet image of the city.



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<sup>17</sup> M. Romanchenko “Holm Slavy” [The Hill of Glory], *Vilna Ukraina*, 9 May, 1955, nr. 109, p.4.



**Picture 3 The Largest Memorial and Monumental Project for the City: The Hill of Glory (1945-1953), 1956**

From the very beginning it was clear for both local and central party-state authorities that the memorial was to become a flagman project not only for commemorating the war, but also for rearranging the cityscape of Lviv. The construction of the Hill was a large investment and as such produced a long correspondence, both about the shape and outlook of future memorial but also about how to finance it.

The decision about the Hill of Glory was made at the latest in September 1944. This is indirectly confirmed by a decree from September 21, 1944 assigning a large part of the territory in the upper part of Lychakivska to the future memorial.<sup>18</sup> The name for future memorial, the “Hill of Glory” was already used as an official one. At the very beginning, the Hill of Glory meant also to incorporate selected part of a local pre-Soviet history. This is clear from how the territory was chosen for the Hill. For the latter a large 1ha piece of the Lychakivskiyi/Łyczakowski Park was assigned. Thus, in the decree there is an indication that “Hill of Glory” is a site where Russian [here used Rus’kykh]<sup>19</sup> soldiers killed near Lviv in 1914 were buried and which was closed by Polish state.<sup>20</sup> In this way, Lviv’s memorial has got not only

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<sup>18</sup> PALO, 4, 1, 1, p. 54

<sup>19</sup> Rus’kyi as an adjective was used in Galicia before Ukrainian was introduced. See: MAYBE SEREDA’s article?

<sup>20</sup> PALO, 4, 1, 1, p. 54

a pre-history but also a link to the historic narrative of the territories which belonged to the Russian Empire and after 1917 became parts of the Soviet state.



**Picture 4 A Cross over the Grave of the soldiers of the Russian Army, 1915 (to the left); An Obelisk at the Hill of Glory constructed in the later 1940s commemorating the Russian soldiers fallen in the First World War (to the right)**

Architectural shape of the memorial was discussed throughout 1945 and by 1946 there was a complete draft version of how the memorial should look like. Yet in May 1946 the project was significantly revised. In this presentation I will focus on several elements which stirred hottest discussion in the process of planning the monument. Not realized, they show both options considered and limits imposed on the making of both the war tale and the official image generally for Lviv.

Given a large space, the memorial was originally seen as a combination of cemetery-necropolis. Moreover, the plan for the monumental complex had to incorporate several topics. While the cemetery had to embody efforts and sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the planned monument had to embody the victory of the Red Army generally over the Nazis and in the local context the victory in the battle for Lviv. The monument was presented under the name “Victory”. Despite the fact that many ideas, including one on the Victory Monument in Lviv were dropped, the analysis of internal debates about this monument helps to see the ways, in which people directly involved into the image-making and memory-policies for Soviet Lviv were thinking and imagining the city and components for its new profile.

Among discussed topics for the central monument it is worth to look closer at a proposal to incorporate and expose the topic of the unification of Ukraine in 1939 and to bring it to viewers as the aim that the Soviet soldiers were fighting for. Such idea corresponded to a wider trend of flirtation with

the topic of the Ukrainianhood in the Soviet Union. Playing with a national sentiment and trying to use it for enhancing and promoting fighting spirit of Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army began as early as July 1941 with the Nikita Khrushchev address to Ukrainian people.<sup>21</sup> One of the main components of the Ukrainianhood topic was the Unification tale, which has got large propaganda coverage in the Soviet Union during the period from 1939 to 1941. The image of liberated and unified Ukraine was promoted in the last year of war and entered the Soviet Ukrainian official canon of the memory of the war. It was often an image of “blood shed for the unity,” an image multiplied and promoted in Lviv to stress the input of Soviet Ukrainians (from the eastern part) in the case of the Unification.



**Picture 5 Symbolic Messages of the Hill of Glory. National Story vs. Internationalist story**

Balanced with the references and emphasis on the eternal brotherhood with Russian people, such Ukrainianhood was instrumentalized in the western regions of Ukraine. Indeed, this powerful narrative of Soviet Ukrainianhood supported with two pillars, i.e. tales of Liberation and of Unification, was written into lives of every community of Soviet Ukraine through countless rites and rituals.<sup>22</sup> It was very apt to employ such narrative in creating Soviet Ukrainian identity for Lviv. Yet, as the narrative generally was at the edge of slipping into promoting particularism, such development was even more probable in western Ukraine. Especially, if we take into account the context of lasting civil war with Ukrainian

<sup>21</sup> Here some parts of the speech: „Comrades, workers, peasants, and intelligentsia of the great Ukrainian people! Forward! For our native Ukraine, for the Soviet Union!” For further discussion see Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 352

<sup>22</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 334-335, 337

nationalist guerrillas. Therefore, both possibilities and limits of using this strategy in Lviv could be seen in such exemplary case, as the Hill of Glory was.

Discussing the project of the sculptures for the Hill of Glory in 1946, architect Oleksii Tatsii<sup>23</sup>, a vice-head of the Department of Architecture of Soviet Ukraine in Kyiv and author of several large architectural projects in Soviet Ukraine suggested casting a monumental image of woman as reference to the topic of Unification. Another known Kyiv-based architect Oleksandr Nerovetskyi<sup>24</sup> added that in this specific case of Lviv a symbol of a struggle of the Russian people for Unification of Ukraine would become the most obvious and appealing message for the city.<sup>25</sup>

This position was opposed by another member of the Department Kosenko, who supported one of the previous ideas that had no reference to the Unification pointing to the fact that soldiers were fighting not only for Ukraine, but for the victory of the Soviet Union. Thus, he continued, there was no need to place a monument representing Ukraine, either in a central place or as a part of the ensemble of the Necropolis.<sup>26</sup> The decision of this specific meeting in July 1946 was to use for the central monument a composition with a soldier putting a flag as a symbol of the Victory. But in the end due to limited funding, the entire project of the platform with the Victory monument was dropped.<sup>27</sup> From the 1946 discussion on whether to represent Ukraine, and if so, should it be a figure of monumental woman,<sup>28</sup> we see how sensitive an issue of balancing patriotic symbols and Soviet internationalist approach was. Also, we see how this particular discussion was informed by an increasingly ethnicized Soviet world, where explicitly or implicitly, ethnicity was a factor in decision-making.<sup>29</sup> The story with representation of the Unification topic in Lviv continued during the following decades until the early 1980s, when the monument for the Unification in 1939 was finally unveiled at one of the entrance roads to Lviv. Yet, at the same time, this topic remained a corner stone of verbal and visual narratives in the region and the city. Such dual approach and ambivalence with the limits and possibilities of interpreting

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<sup>23</sup> Oleksiy Tatsii was known for several large representative projects, i.e. pavilion of the Soviet Ukraine at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow, large cinema "Kyiv" in the capital of Soviet Ukraine, sanatorium buildings in Odessa and Crimea, as well as the first large-blocks and large-panels housing projects in the early 1930s. More see *Arkhitektori Oleksa Tatsii (1903-1967): Bibliografichnyi pokazhchyk*, ed. by G.A. Voytsekhivska, Ye.O. Tatsii, Kyiv: Pryma, 2003, 84p.

<sup>24</sup> Oleksandr Nerovetskyi (1884-1950) was specializing in industrial building, took part in number of large industrial projects leading construction in Donbas and Dnipro River valley (Prydniprovya) in the 1920s and published books on the issues related to industrial urban development and industrial architecture. He was a founding member of Academy of Architecture of Soviet Ukraine in 1945. See [http://www.uaa.iatp.org.ua/Biography/Bio\\_Nerovetsky\\_ua.htm](http://www.uaa.iatp.org.ua/Biography/Bio_Nerovetsky_ua.htm) (accessed on May 16, 2008) and in D.N. Yablonskyi "Pershi kroky Akademii Arkhitektury URSS," in *Khto ye khto v budivnytstvi i arkhitekturi*, issue 1, Kyiv: Kyivska pravda, 2003, 270p.

<sup>25</sup> TsDAVOU, P-4906, 1, 2188, p. 9-10

<sup>26</sup> TsDAVOU, P-4906, 1, 2188, p. 14.

<sup>27</sup> TsDAVOU, P-4906, 1, 3403, p. 13

<sup>28</sup> TsDAVOU, P-4906, 1, 2187, p. 9

<sup>29</sup> See Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 114f, Francine Hirsch, "The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," *Slavic Review* 56, no. 2, 1997: 251-78; Francine Hirsch, *Empire of nations: ethnographic knowledge and the making of the Soviet Union*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005; Yuri Slezkin, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism." *Slavic Review*, 53, 1994: 414-52

both this and other topics from Lviv's past one finds in other examples. Thus, this indicates for us that the entire memory-identity project "Soviet Lviv" was constantly carrying an inherent possibility of hinting at topics, which were considered as dangerous or neglected as irrelevant. It was a constant question for the party-state authorities of how much and in what way Lviv has to appear as a Ukrainian city. At the same time, the Soviet element had to be and was at least as important. Though, blending these two components, there was a danger of over-promoting Ukrainianess of Lviv. On the other hand, without representing Lviv as a Ukrainian city, it would be indeed very difficult to legitimize Soviet project, especially among the population of this region.

Much less prominent element discussed at the beginning, but later dropped for ideological reasons, was the issue whether to have a sculpture representing Lviv under Nazi occupation. This issue was not brought up into a large Kyiv discussion about the Hill of Glory. Most probably it was launched as a local initiative and dropped on this level as well. Yet, it is important to look closer at the formulation of what was chosen as a topic for commemorating Lviv under the Nazi Germany occupation, who has made a suggestion, and why it was not realized. Such an examination sheds light on the relations between the city's experience of the war and occupation and the city as both a place hosting the memorial to the Great Fatherland War and an object represented in the war commemorating according to the officially set framework and expectations. The idea to place a sculpture referring to the occupation in Lviv was voiced on a general meeting organized by the Lviv branch of the Union of Architects. This meeting gathered both architects and sculptures to see and discuss projects for the monumental ensemble to be placed at the Hill of Glory. The meeting took place on February 18, 1946 in Lviv.<sup>30</sup>

The topic conceptualized within the narrative of "local representation" was raised by sculpture Vasyl Forostetskyi. At this Lviv meeting he explained the "initiative about incorporating a sculpture to Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet citizens murdered in Lviv during the occupation into a model of the memorial."<sup>31</sup> It is important to note from the very beginning that such topic would be first of all a very unusual one for a general perception in post-war Soviet Union of what should be commemorated in the war. The Soviet epos of the war promoted a heroic tale as being of greater importance for legitimization, making the sense of the recent war and of the state's input into the victory. Thus, the heroic tale has got a definite priority in representation than the story of victimization. It was also seen as a mobilizing myth, while the myth of victimization was reminding about defeat and humiliation.<sup>32</sup> In post-war years and also during the later decades both prisoners and those who stayed under the occupation

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<sup>30</sup> DALO, P 1657, 1, 11, p. 1

<sup>31</sup> DALO, P 1657, 1, 11, 1

<sup>32</sup> For the discussion of this issue in relation to shaping post-war myth of the war and place of Jews and the Holocaust in it, see Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 232

were treated with suspicion by the Soviet state and even become subjects for repression. Therefore, topics linked to prisoners and murdered under occupation received a small and distorted place in the Soviet official commemorative narrative of the war. There was almost no discussion about trauma, battlefields, depression, and stress of soldiers in the reports from the front line as well as in later texts about the war.<sup>33</sup> Of course suffering was part of the official Soviet narrative of the war, but as a generalized picture. A fate of civilian population was thus incorporated into the war myth as a generalized representation of suffering, with some examples. Yet, in overall picture it stayed as a minor element.

In Lviv, it was even more difficult to select images representing horror of the occupation. Indeed, the city's inhabitants killed or imprisoned during the occupation were Soviet citizens because of Lviv's conquer by the Soviet state in 1939. But exactly because the territory was annexed so late, its population was treated with reservation. In creating the image of the end of the war as a "Liberation story" for Lviv, we can see that authorities' decision aimed to do it as a heroic story with necessary symbols and events. This would enhance the link of the city with Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Precisely because suffering of Lviv's inhabitants were even further separating the city from the Soviet political and memory body, the local topic promoted officially was cast through the private Marchenko's figure, a representative of eastern regions of Ukraine, coming to Lviv in 1939 to bring Soviet expertise as a worker and returning in 1944 as a hero to liberate the city sacrificing his life.

### Oleksandr Marchenko: Presenting and Commemorating a Hero

Thus, in the final variant, there was no Victory sculpture, no sculpture for civilian/local suffering. There was a figure of private Marchenko who was shaped as the ideal everyman of the Red Army for Lviv.

A sergeant major of a tank crew, he was the one who put the red flag on the tower of the city council during the battle for Lviv in July 27, 1944. He personalized an image of heroic soldier for the "Lviv's liberation". Moreover, he was modeled as a local symbol of a Soviet Man shaped by Soviet experience and by the war. For Lviv Marchenko was fashioned to stand for "the Soviet Man, the soldier-liberator, created by the great land of the Soviets, molded by the party of Lenin-Stalin, [who] carries the high principle of our progressive Bolshevik idea" as Nikolai Tikhonov written in 1945 in Moscow *Literaturnaia gazeta*.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, Marchenko was a sergeant major of a tank crew. This group of army regiments cherished a special place in both the war experience and post-war imagination, as both a strong friendship and technical competence of the warfare singled them out. This, abilities to manage

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<sup>33</sup> Merridale, *Ivan's War*, p. 15

<sup>34</sup> Nikolai Tikhonov, *Pered novym pod'yemom: Sovetskaya literatura v 1944-45gg.* (Moscow: Literaturnaia gazeta, 1945), cited in Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 19

and care about tank, a machine that was one of the symbols of the recent warfare, also added to a special status of tank men compared to an average infantryman.<sup>35</sup> In Marchenko's story, thus we can find parts of this particular tank affiliation. First they appear in descriptions of the tank on which he with his crew entered the city and which was in 1945 turned into the monument put at the end of the Lenin Street. Secondly, coming in a story of Marchenko's way through Lviv with a support of his tank fellows and friends, among whom he has died.



**Picture 6 Symbolic Messages of the Hill, Shaping Local Hero: Oleksandr Marchenko Story. He as a "Soldier with Flag" at the Hill of Glory (1974)**

Usually, in the texts dedicated to "Lviv's liberation," especially guidebooks, Marchenko is represented mainly as a soldier of the Red Army. Yet in some articles for local magazines we find more details related to his life as a civilian. Through the biography of Marchenko the link to the "first foundation myth" was established. A retrospective biographical story about Marchenko as a young engineer coming to Lviv in 1939 to work as inspector of railway buildings fits into a general picture of Soviet project as bringing "liberation and progress".<sup>36</sup> Yet not only was a linkage between the 1944 Liberation and the 1939 Unification promoted. The Marchenko's sacrifice was interpreted and represented, especially from the early 1960s, as a symbolic act of "bringing new beginning." In romantic image the link between Marchenko's death and city's future is envisaged through a metaphor of "heart beating."

<sup>35</sup> For description of the tank man see Merridale, *Ivan's War*, p. 186-187

<sup>36</sup> Rokotov, *Kholm*, p. 27

Thus a publication for the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the “Lviv’s liberation”, allures to the hero’s death but reaffirms reader that “[beating of his heart] echoes in engines of Lviv buses, truck tractors, loading machines, his blood is pulsing in Lenin’s bulbs, chemical retorts, high-voltage wires, his juvenility [is] in youthfulness of our city, in good deeds of Lvivians...”<sup>37</sup>

A link between the city and a hero in the past was also presented as a partial reason why he was able to perform such a heroic act. Marchenko’s knew the city “as his own hand” because he worked in Lviv during first Soviet period.<sup>38</sup> As in myth story there is no place for an accident, the biography of Marchenko as a hero story is made to be coherent. Lviv is part of his biography, from the moment when he as “a young man followed the first regiments of Soviet soldiers and arrived in Lviv liberated from the yoke of Polish landlords.” Thus, he encountered the city in “1939 - a year of the triumph of justice, brave achievements, and high aspirations.”<sup>39</sup> Oleksandr Marchenko was working as an engineer at Lviv Railways and thus his first appearance in Lviv was presented as a “representative of great railway state.”<sup>40</sup> When driving in tank to the city center of Lviv in 1944, he was part of victorious state winning over the Nazi Germany.

His experience together with his pre-war knowledge of the city allowed him to state that he can crackle the labyrinth of narrow and curving streets to “disable local power station,” as the story told that the city was mined by Nazi Germans. His aim was to install a Soviet flag on one of the highest symbolical tower of the city, that of the city hall. Again, the story is constructed in such a way that this act is emerging from Marchenko as a reference to his memory of Lviv in 1939, when “[red] flag in a blue sky over the city was brightest.”<sup>41</sup> Apart from a sense of high mission driving Marchenko we learn from this elaborated representation that there was also a romantic story linking the soldier to the city: a local girl, “Ivanka-Halychanka” was waiting for him in Lviv, a girl who gave him a blue-red scarf, not accidentally referring to colors of the flag of Soviet Ukraine.

Marchenko putting a red flag on top of the Ratusha died as a hero adding a corner stone to the Soviet representation of city’s past, as “a heroic and worth of admiration.”<sup>42</sup> Precisely this reference to Marchenko’s act of putting a red flag on top of the Municipality building Ratusha, Lvivians could see in a sculptural figure “A Soldier with a Flag” underneath which the grave of the hero was placed. This was only one part of the spatial representation of Marchenko’s act in the city.

The highly symbolic image of sergeant Marchenko was shaped as a culmination of Lviv adaptation of a general campaign of “liberation the country” and as such also embodied the

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<sup>37</sup> Petro Ingulskyi, “Misto chervonykh praporiv,” *Zhovten*, nr. 7, 1964, pp. 3-13, p. 4

<sup>38</sup> Rokotov, *Kholm*, p. 30

<sup>39</sup> Ingulskyi, “Misto chervonykh praporiv,” p. 5

<sup>40</sup> Ingulskyi, “Misto chervonykh praporiv,” p. 5

<sup>41</sup> Ingulskyi, “Misto chervonykh praporiv,” p. 6

<sup>42</sup> Ingulskyi, “Misto chervonykh praporiv,” p. 7

establishing of the Soviet beginning for the city after the occupation. Through a yearly repetitive staging of this act of flag rising Soviet Lviv lived again through the July 27, 1944, reaffirming its presence in the city's image. Thus the party-state authorities were attempting to place the event in common memory of the city. Each year the ritual of running up a red flag over the city's Ratusha was performed by two city's representatives – the best soldier of a tank division in Lviv and the best worker of the city. Such choice was both aimed as commemorating event of the “city's liberation” and reverberation of the two cornerstones of the official Soviet identity for the city, which rested upon the “liberation story” and “industrialization story.” The first one represented the founding ground, the beginning of a new life for the city. The second one was an image of both future's perspectives and new quality of the city. Thus in one act, there was a symbolic mixture of one event connected to an entire background of the Great Patriotic War mythology and another one linked to a general concept of transforming a society in the Soviet Union, a project of which Lviv became a part.

To conclude on this part: The war tale was important component legitimizing Soviet presence in the city and appealing to local Ukrainians with the Unification story. But it also had one more function I will mention briefly. Generally the war myth was also fulfilling the function of explaining the trials of past several years. For most the making sense of war was, as Weiner has showed in his study, part of making sense of what has happened, i.e. combat, captivity, hunger, exterminations, deportations, collaboration, resistance, poverty, and so on.<sup>43</sup> Many Soviet citizens from eastern regions of the Soviet Union came to the city. Only in 1946 about 90,000 newcomers arrived to the city alone. Many soldiers returned to their pre-war homes, but some found Lviv as a new place of residence.<sup>44</sup> The war tale was also a legitimacy tale for veterans to promote themselves as new local elite. Generally for all newcomers the local adaptation of the myth was also carrying an answer to the question: why they ended in this city and why this city ended in the Soviet Union?

### **After 1956. Siting Resistance: Extending and Retelling Liberation Story in the City**

While the Hill of Glory was a flagman project of first post-war years, during the 1950s a growing investment of efforts in broadening the scope of commemoration and paying attention to smaller sites came.<sup>45</sup> Following the Red Army Anniversary in 1958 and the official opening of the Hill, numerous,

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<sup>43</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 364

<sup>44</sup> It is true, that some people sent to Lviv were working in the city during so called “first Soviet period,” and even more in personal applications for the residence, many indicated familiarity with the city as a supportive argument for the getting into the city. See DALO....

<sup>45</sup> This seems to be a more general trend, which can partly be explained by the fact that the reconstruction was partly over and the need to build up legitimacy caused more elaboration on the tale of the war. This corresponded to the raise of interests in

first of all repetitive activities, were fashioned within a usual for the Soviet state framework. These were mainly celebrations of the end of the war on May 9 and its local analogue, “Lviv liberation” on July 27, visits of organized groups to the Hill, and meeting the dawn after the graduation from schools.<sup>46</sup> The most prominent from non-repetitive ceremonies was a reburial of Nikolai/Mykola Kuznetsov at the Hill in 1960.

Kuznetsov, a partisan and intelligence officer [*razvedchik/rozvidnyk*] was killed near Brody in March 1944 in a combat with a unit of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Together with Marchenko he became a personified symbol of the *Great Patriotic War*. Once again, the event linked territorially to Lviv region was promoted within the “liberation story”. Introduction of both the memorial plaques, first at the Hill and later in city center, and the monument to Kuznetsov extended the topography of the war in Lviv cityscape. This time it was about bringing a topic related on the one hand to the occupied Lviv and from another hand to the fight with Ukrainian nationalists in the region.

This shift towards an extension of the war story chronologically and thematically, characterized the memory politics in Lviv from the second half of the 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s. Bringing local issues into a foreground was part of a larger shift in attitudes to Lviv and western regions in post-1956 period. Thus, the story of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, the KPZU, was rehabilitated together with the Narodna Hvardia epic of underground fighting in Lviv during the occupation.<sup>47</sup> Both the KPZU and Narodna Hvardia have got a significant share of visual representation in a complex program of marking Lviv cityscape with commemorative plaques. The KPZU share in siting revolutionary tradition is discussed in another part of the thesis.

The Narodna Hvardia from mid-1950s was promoted into a chief resistance group in occupied Lviv. While, as we will see, the Kuznetsov’s figure was fashioned to symbolize Soviet partisan hero working as an agent and coming in Lviv only sporadically, the Narodna Nvardia story was shaped to represent and promote local initiative in resisting Nazi occupation. Moreover, it was shaped not merely as a local, but foremost as a Communist underground with leading role of Ukrainian communists from the pre-war time.

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smaller sites, especially burial places scattered through cities and around them. Thus, as Maria Bucur point out in case of Romania, “in the 1950s a flurry of interest in commemorating the Romanian heroes dead in the Second World War began to surface among ... the leadership.” Reports about the state of monuments and cemeteries were indignant and there was a decision by the Communist Party to “build several monuments to the war heroes, centralize and ‘cleanse’ heroes’ cemeteries, and provide a better space for them.” Of course, it only embraced the burial sites of the soldiers fighting on the side of the Red Army. On complication with separation of soldiers fought on the Red Army side with soldiers fighting against it provoked many complications. More about this see in Maria Bucur, “Edifices if the Past: War Memorials and Heroes in Twentieth-century Romania,” p. 173-174, in *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory*, ed. by Maria Todorova, London: Hurst & Company, 2004

<sup>46</sup> Rokotov, *Kholm*, p. 11-13

<sup>47</sup> On the shaping of mythology of the Narodnaya Hvardia see Amar, *Making of Soviet Lviv, 1939-1963*, chapter 9 and on the KPZU story – chapter 10, as well as article “The Lviv Underground and the Limits of the *Great Fatherland War*, 1944-1991 – A Soviet Core Myth on the Western Periphery” (unpublished)

Introduction of Kuznetsov into a local pantheon of the war heroes was part of a longer competition, especially in Ukraine, between veterans of the Red Army and partisans over the status and place in the war tale. This topic was especially pertinent for Ukraine and Byelorussia as they were the arenas of major partisan movements. The debates were usually expressed in meetings behind the closed doors with occasional publications of the memoirs of leading partisans.

While acknowledgment of partisan movement was aimed at building an image of popular resistance to the Nazi led by party members and based on loyalty to the Soviet power, partisans as people living for years under the realities of the occupation were suspicious and not as reliable as those of the soldier.<sup>48</sup> But in western regions Ukraine and in Lviv in particular, the failure Sovietization strategies in the first post-war period, led to reevaluation of the position local representatives, i.e. people born on the territory of western Ukraine. As the war tale turned into a formative legitimacy myth, it had to be extended to make space for some representatives of local population to fit into the Soviet polity. Partisans, not only locals, would also use the post-1956 shafts and rearrangement to advocate and advance own presence in the war tale.



**Picture 7 Unveiling of the memorial plaque to Nikolai/Mykola Kuznetsov in Lviv, July 27, 1981**

This was a context in which the Kuznetsov story was getting more prominent coverage and his grave was relocated to the Hill of Glory. His figure has got an extensive spatial representation in Lviv

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<sup>48</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 70, 74

and several sites were marked to bring his story into Lviv cityscape. Already in 1958, local party leadership applied for approval of the idea to erect a monument for Kuznetsov to Kyiv Central Committee. The project for the monument was ready in 1959 but the idea was rejected.<sup>49</sup> This answer can be explained by two facts. First, more general, is linked to a fact that the second half of the 1950s was a time when party-state authorities in Kyiv tried to decrease a number of new monuments. Such tendency began already in the early 1950s, when a decree prohibiting erecting monuments from not lasting materials was adopted in December 1952.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, by the decision of the Council of Ministries and the Central Committee of Ukraine, the monument had to be built in Rivno, a city in Volyn region, where Kuznetsov actively worked during the occupation as a Soviet agent.<sup>51</sup> What is most interesting in this effort to place a monument in Lviv is that the initiative primarily and exclusively went from the local party-state authorities. A sculpture for the monument was commissioned and partly already finished without permission from Kyiv. Such initiative in a way shows attempts to adjust larger commemorative frameworks to a very difficult for adaptation local Lviv context. The lack of other prominent figures which would be both somehow linked to Lviv and fit into the Soviet image of the war and occupation, caused a strong lobbying for filling this deficit of "local heroes."<sup>52</sup> Kuznetsov was one of the most fitting and already promoted figures of the war.

Generally, by the mid-1960 in all the Soviet Union as well as in Lviv, with approaching the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the victory over Nazism, the myth of the war finally was shaped and entered a canon stage. The post-war period of purging and pursuing of different elements of this myth was over.<sup>53</sup> In Lviv, both soldiers and partisans, local and from all Soviet Union were included into a pantheon of the heroes. The 1970s and 1980s were marked with numerous initiatives and small activities commemorating the war through different events and personalities. This corresponded with a general shift in the commemorative practices in the Soviet Union, when the myth of war was multiplied through countless commemorative events, books, speeches, medals and memorials, overshadowing even the October tale as a basis of building society's sense of belonging and mission.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> TsDAHOU, 1, 31, 1212, pp. 149, 250

<sup>50</sup> TsDAHOU, 1, 31, 1452, p. 75

<sup>51</sup> TsDAHOU, 1, 24, 5023, p. 4. In 1962 Ivan Hrushetskyi repeats this fact in a letter of support for Lviv monument of Kuznetsov. See PALO, 3, 6, 449, p. 54. He of course was very well informed about these particular projects for Lviv and Rivne, as well as general situation in both cities and regions. He was the first secretary of Lviv obkom, de facto main person of the western region, from 1944 until 1951 (with break in 1949); then, through 1961 he was the first secretary of Volyn obkom and again in 1961-62 the first secretary of Lviv obkom. Afterwards he was working in the Central Committee and Party Bureau of the CPU in Kyiv.

<sup>52</sup> PALO, 3, 6, 449, p. 54

<sup>53</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, p. 233

<sup>54</sup> For description of this shift in commemoration, see Merridale, *Ivan's War*, p. 322-323; Michael Ignatieff, "Soviet War Memorials," *History Workshop Journal*, 17, Spring 1984, pp. 157-163; Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*, New York, NY, 1994

## **An Attempt to Create a More Inclusive Soviet War Commemorative Narrative for Lviv: 1986-89**

In 1987 the republican government of Soviet Ukraine answered petition from Lviv regional executive committee to place “several commemorative signs dedicated to victims of fascism.”<sup>55</sup> Three places were indicated in the decree issued in Kyiv at February 2, 1987: in the area of Lysynychi forest, “at the territory of former ‘ghetto’,” and at the “territory of former Cytadel.” The initiative came from the Lviv party-state and has got legal form in decree issued by local party and state authorities on August 26, 1986, which was a month after the 42th anniversary of “Lviv liberation.”<sup>56</sup> These three sites were an attempt to incorporate a story of Jewish population of the city into the official narrative by marking main sites of their persecution and murder. The late Soviet decision about monument to the victims of Lviv ghetto was realized in 1992 with the initiative of local Jewish society as well as with the help of the Jewish Diaspora. Yet the issue of commemorating and marking other sites of the Holocaust in Lviv remained a difficult and debated question in post-Soviet Lviv.

## **The War Myth in Danger: Attacks on Soviet Monuments in 1989-1991**

Throughout 1989 and 1991 the city became a stage for an open competition between representations of the Communist party and oppositional organizations. Apart from meetings on the main city boulevard, different symbolic symbols of Communism were attacked by oppositional groups of Lvivians. Indeed, local Communist elite has found itself in a new environment, losing strength and legitimacy to impose own vision of the past. One of the most striking attempts to preserve one of the Soviet symbols for Lviv under the pressure of a perspective of its dismantling took place in May 1991. The internal party meeting was about possibilities of transferring the monument “Tank” at the end of Lenina/Lychakivska Street into new surroundings. This discussion was forced by a rising religious movement and the demands to reestablish churches in their original function. When choosing a place for the Tank monument in 1945, it was important for the Lviv post-war party-state authorities to combine a possibility of having an overview of the city, marking a route of the Red Army unit advance into Lviv, and counterweighing standing Rome-Catholic monumental church at the top of the street. By 1991 situation has changed dramatically and several representatives of the ideological office of the *raikom* submitted a letter with the initiative to relocate the monument to neighboring Hill of Glory. Listing supporting arguments for such idea, the secretary of Chervonoarmiiskyi (later Lychakivskiyi) rayon pointed out that a shift in attitudes towards Soviet monuments and their public expressions, as, for

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<sup>55</sup> PALO, 3, 72, 734, p. p. 34

<sup>56</sup> PALO, 3, 72, 734, p. p. 34

example, “deliberate damaging of monument to fallen [Soviet] soldiers became more often.”<sup>57</sup> Even more striking was anticipation of “[demands] to demolish the monument” linked to advancing requests for reopening the church standing behind the Tank monument. Combining these two factors resulted in an offer to raikom to initiate relocation of the monument as a chance to increase “party authority among believers” and to “avoid malicious destruction [*naruha*] of the monument.” Such offer was not accepted and indeed looked as a fantastic idea. But at the same time this document sheds light on imagination of local authorities about a shift in perception of Soviet monuments in Lviv cityscape. Moreover such arguments reflected formerly latent, but constantly growing awareness of the party-state that the Soviet monuments were alien to the city and large parts of its population. This was also a feeling noted by a higher party official in his hand-written comment that supporting such initiative of raikom officials would look as “Soviet power was putting monuments while population was against.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> PALO, 3, 62, 965, p. 25

<sup>58</sup> PALO, 3, 62, 965, p. 25