Hrynevych.,Vladyslav

 I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,  (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“World War II in Official Politics of Memory and Political Disputes in Ukraine Today”

More than six decades after the end of World War II, the historical memory of this conflagration remains relatively painful. Every country has adopted its own “official” recollections and remembrance.  Democratic societies have tended largely to reject the pompous and grandiose celebration of May 9th as “Liberation Day,” and chose to honor and pay tribute to all victims of the war and to condemn the war as an inhuman event. This attitude finds its most explicit expression in Canada’s and other states’ of the Commonwealth tradition of the Memorial Day on November 11. A red flower worn that day on the outer garments by officials as well as by the average citizen has become a symbol of remembrance and grief for the victims of several wars.
Most of the countries in Central and East Europe also attempt, on the one hand, to break with the tradition of an excessive exaggeration of heroes’ statuses and demonic descriptions of the enemies of past wars,  and strive to establish an overall picture and understanding of World War II as a huge tragedy. On the other hand, during this process to establish an official policy of remembrance for WWII by a number of former Soviet bloc countries, a tendency has emerged to regard this day of the liberation by the troops of the Red Army from the Nazi occupation at the same time as a “day of change from one totalitarian regime to another”.
In present-day Russia the victory over the Fascists in the “Great Patriotic War” 1941-1945 is viewed as one of the most important holidays for the entire nation. The Russian practice and experience of viewing May 9th as a Great Victory Day and filling it with a political and ideological content differ from those of many European nations.  In a real sense this can be seen as a major Russian attempt at the political and ideological rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinism as well as a means to celebrate a Russian nationalism and to propagate the idea of Russia’s power as a nation and state.
The official Ukrainian policy of memory concerning World War II can generally be characterized as an attempt to unify elements of the “old” (the Soviet) and the “new” (the Western) traditions in a new model. On the one hand, it still at times leans towards an excessive idealization of the war and to the creation of myths by constructing new symbolic systems to describe “heroes” and “enemies”. On the other hand, anti-Communist and anti-Imperialist motives are noticeable in the official evaluations of the war given by the highest Ukrainian political authorities. In this respect, the Ukrainian model of a historical memory to describe the war is very similar to the models of remembrance delivered by a number of European post-Communist countries.
In addition, the whole process of an establishment of Ukrainian official policy of memory concerning World War II is complicated by a number of other factors. Among these are – as a result of the specific impact of a Soviet propaganda – different experiences and a different perception of this war by those who participated actively in it; an excessive politicization of  the war topic; and its active utilization by various politicians for their own goals. One basic negative impact on that process is also the repeated attempt of the contemporary Russian officials to force upon the Ukraine its “own” view of World War II history as the one “common and only acceptable” interpretation for the Ukraine as well as for Russia.
Without a doubt, the negative influence of Soviet propaganda will persist and continue to concern several generations of Ukrainians. Within the official policy of remembrance in the former-USSR in connection with World War II, the “myth of the Great Patriotic War” was based on ideological principles such as the moral-political unity of the entire Soviet nation (folk or people), the leading role of the Communist Party, the unity of Soviet society, the unity of the leading party and the people, the unity of front-line and the rear-lines during the conflict, the fervent Soviet patriotism and mass heroism, and the friendship of all people of the Soviet Union. All of these mythical elements, in addition to the creation of a symbolic system of “heroes” and “enemies,” were transferred to the new Ukrainian society. When an independent Ukraine was proclaimed in 1991, when the urge for freedom and democracy was expressed so strongly, a remarkable and decisive need for a distance from the Soviet historical versions concerning World War II was required. A new model of historical memory had to be created that could unify Ukrainian society. In particular, the idea of reconciliation between the fighters of the Red Army and the UPA at the graves of the victims of the war was actively propagated by the current President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko.  Another important element of the official policy of remembrance that emerged was the practice of paying respect to all the soldiers who fought for the Liberation of the Ukraine from the Nazi regime and those who engaged in resistance to the Stalinist regime. Finally, the recent attempt of the highest Ukrainian officials to create a multi-ethnic version of Ukrainian history in World War II can be seen. The clearest expression of this attempt can be found in President Yushchenko’s appeal to regard the Holocaust not only as a tragedy of the Jews but also as a catastrophe for all Ukrainians.